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An Application of Hierarchicalism to Anencephalic Newborns 
by David A. Lindholm 
 
 A survey of modern medical practice reveals no shortage of ethical controversies. The root of these 
controversies is often a conflict between two or more ethical norms. According to the idea of hierarchicalism, 
such conflicts are resolved by devising a hierarchy of norms, giving priority of compliance to the “higher” norm 
and negating moral accountability for failing to comply with the “lower” norm. Intuitively, such an approach 
seems valid, as we have all witnessed situations in which absolute norms conflict and an agent must make a 
decision to follow the one and reject the other. The difficulty, however, comes in assessing which norm has 
priority. Therefore, a hierarchical approach to any moral question requires careful consideration of the relevant 
factors of each case and an assessment of whether “the duty chosen either counterbalances or overbalances the 
duty not chosen” (Feinberg and Feinberg, 1993, p. 32). Based on this counterbalancing-overbalancing criterion, 
I will apply a hierarchical framework to the question of using anencephalic newborns as organ donors, and will 
show that the morally correct response is an emphatic “no.” 
 Occurring in about one in 1000 births, anencephaly is a congenital defect characterized by the absence 
of the cerebral cortex and the presence of a rudimentary brainstem (Sullivan, 2003). The condition is terminal, 
with death usually occurring within three days of birth (Lagay, 2004). Given their lack of actual or even 
potential sentience, some have argued that anencephalic newborns are non-persons and that they should be 
treated as brain dead. Singer and Kuhse, for example, assert that anencephalics are among those “who are 
humans in the sense of being members of the species Homo sapiens but not in the morally significant sense of 
having the distinctively human characteristics…” (1985, p. 123). Because they lack the requisite “indicators of 
humanhood,” empirical functionalists would contend that anencephalics should be used as organ donors before 
clinical death to ensure that “their short and tragic lives have some redeeming value” (Rae, 1993, p. 239). 
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Indeed, in 1994, the American Medical Association’s (AMA) Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs 
deemed it ethically acceptable to transplant a living anencephalic’s organs provided there was parental consent. 
The Council’s reasoning virtually paralleled that of the empirical functionalists. The decision was based on the 
assumptions of the newborns’ immanent death and complete lack of consciousness, as well as the high 
frequency of parental requests that their child’s organs be donated (Lagay, 2004). 
 By contrast others would contend that, despite a lack of higher brain function and with the prospect of 
certain death, anencephalic newborns are nonetheless persons who should be treated with appropriate dignity. 
As Condic (2003) argues, brain death is not equivalent to the loss of higher brain function; rather, it is the loss 
of coordinated integrated function of the body as a whole. To be sure, anencephalic newborns possess 
coordinated integrated function. Although their brain-wave activity is abnormal, anencephalics still possess 
brain-wave activity and are therefore still alive. According to ontological personalism, personhood is inherent in 
the human organism and is not measured by the possession of “indicators of humanhood” or the lack thereof. 
Given the fact that anencephalic newborns are alive and are therefore persons, it is unethical to commodify 
them as valuable for their parts alone (Sullivan, 2003). 
Although the AMA no longer condones the harvesting of organs from anencephalics prior to their death, 
the issue remains controversial and is therefore relevant to the application of hierarchicalism. From the 
perspective of graded absolutism, two conflicting ethical principles are at the root of the question of whether it 
is morally justifiable to use a living anencephalic newborn as an organ donor: the principles of beneficence and 
nonmaleficence. Adherence to the principle of beneficence compels us to help others; adherence to 
nonmaleficence compels us not to harm others (Munson, 2000). 
With regard to the anencephalic question, empirical functionalism emphasizes beneficence, whereas 
ontological personalism emphasizes nonmaleficence. The desire to “redeem” the value of anencephalics by 
donating their organs to others in need corresponds to the “others” focus of beneficence, though it violates 
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nonmaleficence by killing the anencephalic. Likewise, the desire to preserve the life of an anencephalic (i.e., to 
allow the condition to run its terminal course) follows the no-harm doctrine of nonmaleficence, though it does 
not come to the aid of other newborns in need of transplanted organs. 
Certainly, we have a prima facie duty to both principles. But here, the two are at odds, requiring us to 
give priority to one over the other. In order to prioritize these principles, let us consider two maxims that give 
insight into the duties of medical practice. The first is “Above all, do no harm.” The second, from the 
Hippocratic Oath, is “As to diseases, make a habit of two things – to help or at least to do no harm” (cited in 
Munson, 2000, pp. 32 and 34). In both maxims, we see the principle of nonmaleficence (“do no harm”). In the 
second, although we see the principle of beneficence (“to help”), its application is qualified by the caveat, “… 
or at least do no harm.” There is no statement, “Above all, help others.” Rather, there is a duty to help—but not 
at the cost of unnecessary harm (e.g., killing the terminally ill). Thus, the principle of nonmaleficence has a 
basic priority over beneficence. To use the criterion of Feinberg and Feinberg, the duty of nonmaleficence 
overbalances the duty of beneficence (1993). 
The priority of nonmaleficence is reflected in the AMA’s 1969 “Guidelines for Organ Transplantation,” 
which holds that there is “no justification for a relaxation of the usual standard of medical care” for a 
prospective donor (as cited in Lagay, 2004). This application of nonmaleficence was designed to protect the life 
of the donor against abuses seeking transplantable organs at any cost. Given Condic’s definition of brain death 
and the resulting fact that anencephalics are not dead but alive, I would extend the AMA’s 1969 guidelines to 
anencephalics. 
One might counter this priority of nonmaleficence over beneficence by asserting that it is 
nonmaleficence only with respect to the anencephalic, but that it is nonetheless maleficence to the prospective 
organ recipients. That is, not taking the life of one within days of death seals the fate of non-anencephalic 
newborns that could otherwise be saved. The principle of utility, often used to reconcile conflicts between 
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beneficence and nonmaleficence, would assert that medical practice should maximize benefit and minimize 
harm (Munson, 2000). And on the surface, the aforementioned priority of nonmaleficence with respect to the 
anencephalic would seem to violate the principle of utility. However, this counterargument fails in its rationale, 
for it assumes the “greatest good” is quantifiable in terms of the number of lives saved. It fails to recognize that 
an even greater good is upholding the intrinsic value of an individual, regardless of the extent of deformity. If 
one violates the inherent dignity of an individual to save lives, one cheapens the good of saving lives, much less 
the value of life itself. 
In the question of whether living anencephalic newborns should be used as organ donors, a 
consideration of the arguments of each side and an assessment of the underlying ethical principles within a 
hierarchical framework demonstrates that this can never be the morally right response. Living anencephalic 
newborns should not be sacrificed for organs in the name of beneficence. Rather, they should be allowed to live 
out the course of their lives, however short they may be, in the name of human dignity. 
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